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JUSTICE IN SENTENCING: THE ROLE
OF PRIOR RECORD OF CRIMINAL
INVOLVEMENT
ALEXIS M. DURHAM III*
I. INTRODUCTION
American sentencing practices have undergone substantial
transformation during the last decade. The emergence of the jus-
tice model of punishment,' the appearance of evaluation research
apparently revealing the ineffectiveness of correctional treatment, 2
and the subsequent retreat from the rehabilitative rationale have en-
couraged the abandonment of long-standing indeterminate sentenc-
ing systems. By the early 1980's, more than half of the states had
adopted either determinate or mandatory sentences for various
crime classifications. 3 Furthermore, the Federal Sentencing Com-
mission released its determinate sentencing guidelines for the fed-
eral system in 1987.
In the new determinate sentencing systems, the role of the cur-
rent offense, 4 victim injury, use of a weapon, and a host of other
variables have been quantified in order to reduce inequity in sen-
tencing determinations. 5 One of the consequences of this objectifi-
cation has been to increase the visibility of the variables that
* Associate in Criminology, Center for Studies in Criminology and Criminal Law,
University of Florida. Ph. D., University of Pennsylvania, 1984; M.A. University of Penn-
sylvania, 1981; B.A. New College, 1977.
I See, e.g., N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING
JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976); D. FOGEL, "WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF":
THEJUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS (1979).
2 See, e.g., Martinson, lWhat Wlorks? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB.
INTEREST 22, 49 (1974); D. LIP-rON, R. MARTINSON &J. WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
CORRECTIVE TREATMENT, (1975); S. MARTIN, L. SECHREST & R. REDNER, NEW DIREC-
TIONS IN THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS (1981).
3 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE
72 (1983).
4 Current offense refers to the criminal charge.
5 For example, Florida uses primary offense at conviction, additional offenses at
conviction, prior record, legal status at the time of the offense, and the degree of victim
injury as sentence-determining variables in its sentencing guidelines for violent felonies.
FLA. STAT. ANN. Rule 3.988 (West 1986).
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influence sentencing decisions. It is often possible to identify pre-
cisely the amount of weight accorded to each sentence-determining
variable.
In traditional rehabilitatively driven indeterminate sentencing
schemes the offender's general personal experience was considered
relevant to the determination of sentence. Factors such as employ-
ment background, family situation, and residential stability have en-
tered into the sentence determination process. As the justice system
retreated from an interest in providing therapeutic services for of-
fenders, the result was a decrease in the need to utilize information
about the offender's experience to determine the proper sentence.
The resulting sentences under the justice model formulation were
based upon what was deserved for the offense perpetrated, not the
characteristics of the offender.
One component of the offender's experience, however, has re-
mained an important feature of the sentence determination process.
States adopting determinate sentencing statutes, such as Calilfornia,
Florida, and Minnesota, have retained the offender's prior record as
a factor in the determination of a sentence. As will be demonstrated
in this Article, prior record of criminal involvement may play a
larger role than the current offense in the determination of sen-
tence. Given both the justice model focus upon the current offense
and the fact that previous convictions will already have received ap-
propriate punishment, it is unclear whether the justice model can
tolerate the use of prior record as an important variable in the de-
termination ofjust sentences. How is it possible that a desert-based
system is able to utilize already punished behavior as the basis for
increases in the severity of sentences for new convictions? The need
to address this potential source of difficulty is all the more urgent in
light of both the current powerful influence of the justice model in
sentencing theory and practice, and the rapid national spread of de-
sert-oriented determinate sentencing systems that make use of prior
record of criminal involvement.
This Article contributes to the examination of this issue
through a review and analysis of the arguments pertaining to the use
of prior record in sentencing as they relate to the justice model.
The discussion is only marginally concerned with the various utilita-
rian justifications for the use of prior record in sentencing. Ulti-
mately, this analysis suggests that the most viable rationales for the
use of prior record within the justice model framework may require
a torturing of the fundamental retributive foundations of the model.
The arguments considered in this discussion are organized into
four general classifications: arguments of implicit attribute, ele-
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vated harm, leniency, and emotive reparation. Although this classi-
fication is not the only possible categorization of arguments, it is
useful in highlighting similarities and differences between ap-
proaches. After examining the permutations of each argument, the
Article concludes with a consideration of the implications of the dis-
cussion for sentencing policy. The Article begins with a brief histor-
ical summary of the use of prior record in determinations of
punishment.
II. PRIOR RECORD AND SENTENCING: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
AND CURRENT TRENDS
According to the Book of Leviticus, the Lord established a se-
ries of rules regarding obedience. 6 After listing these rules, the
Lord warned:
But if you do not obey Me and do not carry out all of these command-
ments . .. I, in turn, will do this to you: I will appoint over you a
sudden terror, consumption and fever that shall waste away the eyes
and cause the soul to pine away; also, you shall sow your seed use-
lessly, for your enemies shall eat it up. And I will set My face against
you so that you shall be struck down before your enemies; and those
who hate you shall rule over you, and you shall flee when no one is
pursuing you.
7
If this gruesome list of sanctions was not sufficient to discourage
non-compliance, a special provision was added for those who in-
sisted upon continued deviation from the rules.
If also after all of these things, you do not obey Me, then I will punish
you seven times more for your sins. 8
This latter provision may be the earliest instance of the use of prior
record in sentencing. The punishment for disobeying was seven
times that for the initial offense. Actually, this particular provision is
only the first of a series of seven-fold incremental punitive enhance-
ments for continued violation of God's law.
Although it is estimated that Leviticus was written as early as
the fifteenth century, B.C., 9 it has been succeeded by a variety of
similar practices. Quakers exiled from Massachusetts in the seven-
teenth century were subjected to penalties that escalated with each
repeat appearance in the colony.
If any Quaker or Quakers shall presume, after they have once suffered
what the law requireth, to come into this jurisdiction, every such male
6 Leviticus 26.
7 Id. at 26:14-17.
8 Id. at 26:18.
9 THE RYRE STUDY BIBLE 158 (1978).
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Quaker shall for the first offense have one of his ears cut off, and be
kept in the house of correction till he can be sent away at his own
charge, and for the second offense have his other ear cut off .. .for
every Quaker, he or she, that shall a third time herein again offend,
they shall have their tongues bored through with a hot iron .... 10
In 1773, the Connecticut General Assembly created what some
have argued was the first American prison.11 Newgate of Connecti-
cut incarcerated criminals in an old copper mine, thus providing a
mitigation of punitive severity for perpetrators of a limited number
of offenses. Furthermore, in the prison's enabling legislation, the
Assembly provided punitive enhancements for recidivism.
That whoever shall commit burglary ... or shall rob any person in the
field or highway ... shall for the first offense suffer imprisonment in
said gaol and work-house, and there be kept to hard labour for a term
not exceeding ten years ... And if any such person shall commit the
like offense a second time and be thereof convicted as foresaid, he or
she shall suffer imprisonment in said gaol and work-house, and there
be kept to hard labour as aforesaid for and during the term of his or
her natural life. 12
The American tradition of enhancing the punitive character of
sanctions for offenders repeatedly convicted of crimes has survived
into the present. Consider, for instance, the frequently cited case of
Rummel v. Estelle.' 3 After receiving his third felony conviction in
1973, William Rummel was sentenced to life in prison under the
Texas habitual offender provision. 14 Although none of his convic-
tions were for crimes of violence and the total property loss for the
offenses totaled only $229.11, he was a habitual recidivist according
to Texas law. Rummel received a life sentence with eligibility for
parole possible only after he had served a minimum of twelve years.
Rummel challenged the constitutionality of his sentence. He
argued that the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution
expressly prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, and that the ex-
cessive severity of his sentence exceeded what was permissible
under this standard. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the
decisions of the lower court15 . In the majority opinion, Justice
10 Massachusetts Public Records IVa, 308-09, quoted in K. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS
117 (1966).
11 See Durham, Newgate of Connecticut: Origins and Early Days of an Early American Prison,
JUST Q. (1988)(forthcoming); A. D'Amato, Newgate to Wethersfield: The Development
of Prison Reform in Nineteenth Century Connecticut (1972)(unpublished Master's
thesis).
12 Connecticut Public Records 207 (May 1773).
13 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
14 See TExAs PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d)(formerly Art. 63). This section allows a
life sentence for adult defendants convicted of a third felony offense.
15 587 F.2d. 651 (5th Cir. 1978)(en banc).
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Rehnquist noted that Rummel's punishment addressed not only the
instant offense, but also his recidivism. 16
Thus, the use of special punitive enhancements for repeat of-
fenders, which Fletcher refers to as the "recidivist premium,"' 17 has
a lengthy and familiar history. In a criminal justice system that seeks
to reduce crime through forward-looking, utilitarian strategies, re-
cidivist statutes seem well-justified. For certain crimes, a preventive
effect may be achieved through the use of carefully designed tech-
niques for the selective incapacitation of high-risk offenders.' 8 Pe-
culiarly enough, at the very time when selective incapacitation seems
to be gaining substantial support, due in part to the development of
more sophisticated techniques for the identification of such offend-
ers, it also finds itself directly confronting the recently emerging jus-
tice model of punishment. The justice model or 'just deserts"
model as it is alternatively called, posits that punishment is justified
if it comports with the seriousness of offensive conduct.' 9 The
model has its roots in the retributive tradition 20 and thus has limited
interest in forward-looking justifications for the exercise of the
state's punitive power. Rather, its primary interest is in confinement
of the state response to punishments that are justified by a back-
ward-looking evaluation of the acts perpetrated by the offender.21
The model seems as uncomfortable with the medical model of reha-
bilitation,22 which promises a transformation in the characteristics
of its "clients," as it is with strategies that proclaim the ability to
reduce the crime rate through forward-looking deterrent or in-
capacitative effects.
Recidivist statutes appear to fit comfortably within the forward-
looking approach of policies most concerned with utilitarian strate-
gies for crime control. Their justification is tied to preservation of
public safety, rather than to enhancement of the justice of criminal
justice system initiatives. For instance, the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code of 1962 advocates punitive enhancements if "the
16 445 U.S. at 278-84. It should be noted that other factors, such as the availability of
parole under Texas law, influenced the Court's decision. Id.
17 See Fletcher, The Recidivist Premium, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 54 (1982).
18 Crimes such as robbery and burglary have been examined for potential incapacita-
tive effects. See P. GREENWOOD, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION (1982); M. MOORE, S. Es-
TRICH, D. McGILLIS & W. SPELMAN, DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: THE ELUSIVE TARGET OF
JUSTICE (1985).
19 See von Hirsch, Desert and Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 65 MINN. L. REV. 591
(1981).
20 1. KANT, 2 RECHTSLEHRE 49E (1796).
21 See, e.g., A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 1; N. MORRIS, supra note 1; D. FOGEL, supra note
1.
22 See, e.g., K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1968).
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defendant is a persistent offender whose commitment for an ex-
tended term is necessary for protection of the public." 23 In their
Report on Corrections, the National Advisory Commission on Crim-
inal Justice Standards and Goals offered a similar justification for
extended terms.
State penal code revisions should contain separate provision for sen-
tencing offenders when, in the interest of public protection, it is con-
sidered necessary to incapacitate them for substantial periods of time.
The following provisions should be included: . . . Authority for the
judicial imposition of an extended term of confinement of not more
than 25 years, except for murder, when the court finds the incarcera-
tion of the defendant for a term longer than 5 years is required for the
protection of the public and that the defendant is a) a persistent felony
offender, b) a professional criminal, or c) a dangerous offender.24
This sentencing standard defines a persistent felony offender as:
over twenty-one years of age; convicted of three felonies, with one
of the prior felonies occurring within five years of the current of-
fense; with the felonies including at least two crimes where serious
bodily harm was either intended or accomplished. 25 This standard
is far more exclusive than the one used in Rummel.
Several states have incorporated provisions from such models
and recommendations into their codes. Florida law currently con-
tains habitual offender provisions for both felons and misdemean-
ants.26 Neither provision requires that crimes of violence be
involved as criterion offenses. In addition, Florida allows the inclu-
sion of behavior that has not resulted in a criminal conviction in the
tabulation of prior record.
For purposes of this section, the placing of a person on probation
without an adjudication of guilt shall be treated as a prior conviction if
the subsequent offense for which he is to be sentenced was committed
during the probationary period.27
Alaska has treated the commission of a crime by a defendant who is
out on bail for a pending charge as a sentence-enhancing variable. 28
Again, no determination of guilt need be made for the initial
charged offense. Indeed, the charge leading to bail may ultimately
never result in a conviction. California, on the other hand, adopted
a sentence enhancement provision based not on conviction alone,
but rather on the more restrictive test of previous felony
23 See MODEL PENAL CODE Standard 5.3 (1962).
24 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINALJUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, RE-
PORT ON CORRECTIONS 294 (1973).
25 Id.
26 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.084 (West 1986).
27 Id. at § 775.084(2).
28 R. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT 78 (1979).
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incarceration.2 9
Thus, in practice as well as in proposal, a prior record of in-
volvement in criminality has provided a basis for additional punitive
severity. In some jurisdictions, such as Texas, these enhancements
have appeared in special habitual offender acts. In other jurisdic-
tions, such as Florida, sentencing guidelines use an offender's prior
record as one of a variety of aggravating factors leading to extended
sentences.3 0
However, as suggested above, most sentence enhancement pro-
visions have been conceived as crime control strategies. Enhance-
ment predates the emergence of the backward-looking retributivist
approach and poses a potential predicament for the justice model.
Given the current importance of justice-oriented determinate sen-
tencing systems, it is important to examine the arguments related to
the use of prior record within the justice model framework.
III. ARGUMENTS OF IMPLICIT ATTRIBUTE
Arguments of implicit attribute assert that the very commission
of repeat acts of criminality implies the existence of personal attrib-
utes or characteristics not apparent through more direct evidence.
Furthermore, these attributes are relevant to the process of sen-
tence-determination. There are several versions of this argument,
all relying upon the general claim that recidivism is indicative of a
greater personal evil and, hence, a higher level of moral culpability.
According to this view, the offender who insists upon repeat acts of
criminality reveals a more evil nature than does his non-recidivist
counterpart, even if the instant act at hand is equivalent. In the con-
ventional metric of the justice model, the severity of punishment is
tied to the culpability of the offender.3 1 Thus, the more culpable
the offender, the more severe the punishment merited.
This viewpoint seems to be little more than an argument about
the general character of the offender. Singer, in his critique of von
Hirsch, argues that prior record is actually a proxy for the general
character of the offender.3 2 He notes that the use of criminal record
to assess character invites the use of a multiplicity of other variables,
such as employment history, childhood experience, and religious
practices, to determine proper punishment.33 Singer's point is that
29 Id. at 92.
30 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.084.
31 See A. VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS
IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 71-74 (1985).
32 R. SINGER, supra note 28, at 69-71.
33 Id. at 70.
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if society is concerned with the character of the offender, then it is
appropriate to have an interest in any variable available which may
contribute to an accurate estimation of this character. Once this
strategy is adopted, however, many of the same sentencing
problems that the justice model presumably is designed to avoid will
be reintroduced. 34
In response to this criticism, von Hirsch notes that Singer's
point regarding prior record refers to its use as a means of establish-
ing the good or bad character of the offender. Von Hirsch argues
that what is at issue is not the general moral character of the of-
fender, but rather the capacity of prior record to reveal whether
criminal behavior is "characteristic" of the offender. 35 However,
von Hirsch does not explain the importance of characteristic behav-
ior. A conventional view would be that the extent to which a behav-
ior is characteristic is important because it conveys something about
the moral nature of the individual and ultimately the blameworthi-
ness of the offender. Thus, to know that criminal activity is charac-
teristic is to know something about the offender's moral character.
Of course, if this is the case, then Singer's argument represents a
serious concern.
A more specific articulation of the implicit attribute argument
proposes that recidivism reveals an aggressive defiance that adds to
the blameworthiness of the offender. 36 The offender has been
alerted by his previous conviction to the unacceptability of his be-
havior. The initial conviction, and perhaps any ensuing punish-
ment, acts as an informational conveyance. After being subjected to
such an informational barrage, the offender cannot fail to under-
stand the message. Continued criminal behavior therefore reflects a
defiance of the law.
Of course, defiance may be too strong a term. Recidivism
might be explained through a milder form of normative resistance,
namely, indifference. In this view, the recidivist displays indiffer-
ence to the messages represented by previous convictions. The of-
fender does not actively pursue opportunities to show contempt or
disregard for societal norms. Rather, his or her behavior simply re-
flects a lack of interest in conformity. The offender who is uninter-
ested in the message conveyed by conviction, the message of
condemnation or threat, is unsatisfactorily attentive to the responsi-
bilities of citizenship. For example, children whose violations of
34 Id. at 69-71.
35 von Hirsch, supra note 19, at 609.
36 Fletcher, supra note 17, at 57.
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school or household rules reflect an absence of interest or attention
are easily distinguishable from those who intentionally and energeti-
cally commit such violations. Similarly, the indifference of the crimi-
nal offender may increase blameworthiness, but his or her evil may
be less troubling than that associated with the more vigorous asser-
tiveness of the defiant recidivist.
Each of the above arguments has at its core two important
ideas. First, repetitive criminal involvement indicates the existence
of "hidden" attributes possessed by the offender. Second, personal
blameworthiness increases as these hidden features are uncovered.
Of course, hidden attributes might be revealed by continued crimi-
nal activity without necessarily increasing blameworthiness. For in-
stance, the discovery of a defect in an individual's ability to learn
new lessons, such as the lessons presumably taught by the experi-
ence of criminal conviction, might help explain recidvism without
adding to the culpability of the offender. In the arguments at hand,
however, the revealed attributes do increase blameworthiness, and
ultimately influence the amount of punishment deserved by the
offender.
There are several difficulties with this view. First, is there any
reason, beyond unquestioned acceptance of prior record of criminal
involvement as a proxy or indicator, to accept the assertion that
such hidden attributes actually exist? Certainly it is logically consis-
tent with a record of continued criminal activity that defiance, indif-
ference, or general evil malevolence be found at the source of the
behavior. Yet, mere logical consistency alone provides only the
thinnest grounds for acceptance. A multiplicity of alternative hy-
pothesized attributes possess an equal level of logical consistency.
One must ask whether there are any independent grounds for view-
ing recidivism as the result of the asserted underlying features. For
instance, if defiance were at the root of recidivistic behavior one
might expect to find defiance expressed in other areas of enterprise.
Does the offender espouse a general rhetoric of repudiation? Do
general dealings with others reflect defiant disregard for normative
expectations? A juvenile gang member displays his defiance
through delinquency but also through patterns of dress, demeanor,
and speech.3 7 The same can be said for the behavior of certain
political reformers and civil dissidents, such as Thoreau. 38 In both
cases, one finds defiance expressed along a variety of behavioral
37 See Piliavin & Briar, Police Encounters with Juveniles, 25 AM. Soc. REV. 206 (1964);
Black & Reiss, Police Control ofJuveniles, 35 Am. Soc. REV. 63 (1970); Lundman, Sykes, &
Clark, Police Control of Juveniles: A Replication, 15 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 74 (1978).
38 See H. THOREAU, WALDEN (1854).
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dimensions. Before the proposition that recidivists are inherently
defiant is accepted, it seems reasonable to ask the empirical question
of whether other expressions of defiance characterize the general
actions of recidivists.
Aside from empirical matters, are hypothesized traits relevant
to the issue of just punishment? Defiance may not be mannerly or
behaviorally appealing, but it is generally not illegal. Is a retribu-
tive-based system of punishment willing to tolerate enhancements
of punishment for behavior that itself does not violate any statute?
It may be offensive that a criminal reacts to society's condemnation
with indifference or defiance, but is it sufficiently offensive so as to
warrant criminalization? If so, one might expect to find statutes
criminalizing defiance or indifference apart from any conjunction
with crime. Would punishment be acceptable for a previously con-
victed individual who was defiant, but who elected not to commit
further crimes? Again, recourse to examination of behavioral
dimensions not involving criminal activity might show such defi-
ance. Unless it can be demonstrated that the combination of a cur-
rent criminal act and a non-criminal act results in elevated legal
culpability, it is difficult to justify punitive enhancements based
upon such a combination.
Of course, it must be specified whether it is conduct or personal
characteristics that merit enhanced punishment. Is it the act of defi-
ance or the state of being defiant that warrants enhancement? If it is
the latter, then the extra punishment is added for what the offender
is, rather than for what he does. This appears to be a curious rever-
sion to punitive rationales that focus on the character of the criminal
instead of the attributes of the crime. The rehabilitative rationale,
much criticized by enthusiasts of the justice model, makes vigorous
use of such personal characteristics. It can be argued that because
blameworthiness itself is a personal attribute rather than an act, the
justice model does tolerate use of personal features.3 9
The justice model, however, generally assumes that humans are
free agents choosing their acts, and are thus responsible for the con-
sequences of such acts. Blameworthiness is the default condition
and is subject to question only in the presence of special mitigating
factors. 40 Responsibility for actions is a feature of all persons, not
an attribute found only in criminals. In contrast, evil, defiance, or
indifference are not universally assumed of all persons, and their
39 von Hirsch, supra note 19, at 609-12.
40 See, e.g., H. GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINALJUSTICE 453 (1979); A. VON HIRSCH,
supra note 31, at 72.
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attribution represents a process directed at specific individuals. The
justice model's purported disinterest in most non-universal per-
sonal variables41 strains the credibility of the use of attributes such
as personal defiance.
On the other hand, if defiant acts are the target of punitive en-
hancements, it is necessary to show the act to be not just an evil, but
an evil worthy of punishment. Additionally, if the act of defiance
justifies extra punishment, if punishment is to be apportioned ac-
cording to the seriousness of the crime, and if the seriousness of the
crime is to be determined in terms of harm and culpability,42 how
are we to measure the amount of defiance associated with a particu-
lar criminal act? Presumably, the amount of defiance contributes to
the total blameworthiness of the offender and must be specified
before an appropriate punishment can be determined. It might be
possible to sidestep this problem by arguing that defiance is a di-
chotomous variable and that, when it exists, it occurs in the same
quantity or with the same quality in each instance. This notion,
however, seems to contradict our common experience with defi-
ance. People seem to display various levels of defiance just as they
display various levels of joy, anger, malice, and benevolence.
One final variation on the theme of implicit attribute represents
an effort to tie together the forward-looking policies of selective in-
capacitation with the backward-looking retributivist agenda. Moore
and his colleagues suggest that, due to the inefficiencies in the the
criminal justice system, repeat offenders escape punishment for
more crime than non-recidivists, thereby justifying the use of en-
hanced punishment for repeaters. 43
Given the magnitude of the punishment "deserved" by high-rate of-
fenders, one can reasonably be skeptical that the high rate offenders
get their "just deserts" relative to low rate offenders. To the extent
that high-rate offenders get less than they deserve, an important ineq-
uity is introduced into the system. The guiltiest, most blameworthy
offenders are being punished less than they deserve on the basis of
their acts. . . . [I]f punishments for given offenses are increased for
persistent high-rate offenders, justice might be enhanced because the
distribution of punishment would more closely fit the distribution of
rates of offending. 44
Moore thus suggests that there are hidden attributes of repeat of-
fenders. Repeaters are more frequently involved in criminality than
is suspected. If the criminal justice system were more efficient, this
41 Id. at 136-38.
42 Id. at 64-66.
43 M. MOORE, S. ESTRICH, D. McGILLIS & W. SPELMAN, supra note 18.
44 Id. at 67.
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hidden criminality would be visible for all to observe, and there
would be little objection to imposing punishment for these now
known offenses.
Several considerations plague this analysis. First, it has yet to
be demonstrated that all individuals with records of recidivism have
committed offenses in addition to those leading to convictions. Un-
til this can be shown, the false positive issue must be confronted. In
meeting the false positive problem, it will be necessary to develop
some sense of how many errors society is willing to tolerate to ac-
complish its goals regarding recidivists. In the language bf selective
incapacitation, how many innocent-of-hidden-crime citizens should
be afflicted with more punishment than is deserved in order to pro-
vide just punishment for guilty-of-hidden-crime citizens? The lan-
guage and boundaries of the discussion smack of conventional
utilitarianism 45 and, on that basis, will probably be rejected by many
retributivists.
In addition, there are due process objections to the scenario
Moore presents. Punitive enhancements based upon the assump-
tion of additional criminality effectively convict and sentence citi-
zens for crimes they were never accused of committing. The typical
due process protections allowing defendants to bring forth evidence
contradicting the state's assertion of criminality are bypassed be-
cause charges are never filed. The resulting extra punishment, how-
ever, is nonetheless just as painful as though it were the product of a
careful and scrupulously fair judicial proceeding. The objections
raised by retributivists to enhancing punishment in order to achieve
general deterrent effects seem applicable to Moore's proposal. Fur-
thermore, if, as Davis argues, fair sentences must be the outcome of
a fair process,46 sentences produced in the manner described by
Moore must be unfair. The formal process of determining blame-
worthiness ceases to be fair because it systematically condemns both
the undeserving and the deserving to enhanced punishment. In-
deed, after introducing this approach, Moore backs away from it and
adopts policy recommendations limited to improvements in investi-
gative and prosecutorial efficiency in order to improve the chances
of detecting, apprehending, and convicting higher proportions of
repeaters. 47
In general, arguments of implicit attribute entail both a process
and a result that have been found to be objectionable to retribu-
45 SeeJ. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
(1870).
46 Davis,Just Deserts for Recidivists, 4 CRIM. JUsT. ETHICS 29 (1985).
47 M. MOORE, S. ESTRICH, D. McGILLIS & W. SPELMAN, supra note 18, at 67-68.
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tivists. The commission of mulitiple acts of criminality is utilized as
a device to establish the existence of features that are unapparent
through more direct forms of scrutiny. Advocates of the medical
model approach to punishment have traditionally maintained the
existence of otherwise undetected forms of personal pathology,
often solely on the basis of involvement in crime.48 Enthusiasts of
selective incapacitation have argued that involvement in crime can
be used to discern the existence of the attribute of dangerousness. 49
Furthermore, supporters of the rehabilitative and incapacitative ra-
tionales have argued for, and often practiced, the prediction of fu-
ture behavior on the basis of the asserted attributes, as, for example,
in parole prediction. These forward-looking views have generally
been unacceptable to retributivists. 50 It should be noted, however,
that although retributivists may not be interested in devising pun-
ishments based upon assessments of future behavior, those retribu-
tivists who argue from an implicit attribute approach seem to share
with their medical model and incapacitative antagonists the practice
of asserting the existence of attributes without empirical substantia-
tion. 51 Thus, the difference between retributivists and utilitarians
who defend the use of prior record in sentencing may turn on what
use is made of assumed implicit attributes, not on the assertion of
their existence.
IV. ARGUMENTS OF ELEVATED HARM
Proponents of the justice model argue that punishment should
be related to the harm associated with crime. Serious offenses merit
severe penalties, while minor crimes deserve minor punishments.
Thus, punitive enhancements make sense if recidivistic activity itself
adds to the harm associated with instant offenses. A number of ar-
guments can be adduced in support of the proposition that the harm
produced by a repeat act of criminality exceeds the harm resulting
from an initial criminal act.
One line of thought argues that crime is unacceptable because
it entails taking unfair advantage of those who conform their behav-
ior to the requirements of law. The argument typically posits agree-
48 See, e.g., K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1968).
49 See, e.g., P. GREENWOOD, supra note 18.
50 A notable recent exception is A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 31, at 149-59. Von Hirsch
attempted to provide for a crime control component.
51 In fact, it could be asserted that, for the rehabilitative rationale, involvement in
crime is often viewed as nothing more than a trigger for the initiation of an empirical
process wherein convicts are subjected to empirical assessment to determine whether
pathology is present, not what form it assumes. Thus, rehabilitation asserts that prior
record merely suggests, rather than confirms, the existence of hidden implicit attributes.
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ment as the primary predicate of social arrangements, with
individuals foregoing certain advantages in order to access other,
ultimately more important rights, protections, and opportunities.
Davis offers a succinct description of the advantage viewpoint. In
referring to the criminal, Davis writes:
Even if his act would be morally indifferent were there no law, the
obedience of others makes his disobedience a taking of unfair advan-
tage (all else equal). Others, though they too would like to take such
liberties as he has did not. He has something they do not. The unfair
advantage is the "illicit pleasure" in every crime, whether jaywalking
or murder, prostitution or stealing. What the criminal deserves (for
this act) is a punishment proportioned to that advantage (and to that
advantage alone).52
Conceiving of crime as the taking of unfair advantage still provides
no guidance regarding how the advantages associated with the sum
of individual offenses in a series of offenses manages to total to an
advantage, and equivalently to a harm, greater than the sum of the
individual parts.
In a more recent work, Davis offers a solution. He suggests that
recidivists are especially blameworthy because their acts go beyond
simple unfair advantage.
So, to say that a recidivist deserves more punishment for what he did
than would a first offender for the same act must be to say simply that
the recidivist (by an act seemingly identical to that of a first offender)
takes an unfair advantage that the first offender does not take. But
what might that advantage be? That advantage must, I think, be a
"second order" advantage-that is to say, the unfair advantage of tak-
ing more than one's fair share of unfair advantage.53
Davis uses the analogy of an auction to demonstrate his point.54
He finds merit in the notion that, because recidivists would be will-
ing to pay a price at an auction above and beyond the price that first-
time offenders would pay to purchase a license to commit the same
offense, recidivists must therefore derive an advantage beyond the
advantage accruing to first-time offenders. If no such advantage ex-
isted, how could the willingness to pay more than a first-time of-
fender co-bidder be explained? For Davis, a recidivist is not merely
one who is willing to buy a license to commit an offense with impu-
nity, but one who is willing to buy both that license and an addi-
tional license allowing him to purchase the first license. 55 More
importantly, Davis argues, "we can gauge the unfair advantage of a
52 Davis, How to Make the Punishment Fit the Crime, 27 NoMos 119, 138 (1985).
53 Davis, supra note 46, at 41.
54 Id. at 39-41.
55 Id. at 40.
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particular crime by determining the value of the corresponding 'li-
cense.'. . .The price of 'pardons-in-advance' should correspond to
the advantage taken unfairly by doing the forbidden act without a
license." 56 This correspondence is crucial because punishment is
determined, at least in part, by the amount of unfair advantage ob-
tained by the offender.
Thus, it is fair to impose additional sanctions upon the recidi-
vist because he or she gains additional unfair advantage beyond that
acquired by the first-time offender. This additional advantage is in-
dicated by the recidivist's willingness to purchase the right to com-
mit a crime with impunity for a price that exceeds that charged to
first-time offenders.
Two observations merit mention regarding this view of the re-
cidivist premium, both involving the notion of "unfair advantage."
Davis suggests that criminals take an unfair advantage when they
commit crimes. Athough this conclusion may seem self-evident for
certain kinds of crimes, such as instrumental offenses (larceny, bur-
glary, auto theft), it is difficult to see the unfair advantage for many
other violations. How does the user of a deadly, illegal drug gain an
unfair advantage over his or her law-abiding counterparts, especially
when use of the drug is likely to result in an addiction that will only
bring on further physical and psychological woes? How does the
violent offender who kills a spouse in a moment of passion gain an
unfair upper hand? In both of these examples, the offender may put
himself at a severe disadvantage, in the former case by setting off a
progression of self-destructive behavior, and in the latter case by
eliminating a spouse that is perhaps the offender's main source of
support, pleasure, and comfort. These all-too-common scenarios
also call into question Davis's notion of "illicit pleasure" and sug-
gest that illegal acts, like legal acts, have the capacity to result in
either pleasure or pain, advantage or disadvantage.
More particularly with regard to recidivist premiums, the fact
that an individual might be willing to pay at auction more than a
first-timer for the license to commit a crime with impunity demon-
strates only that individuals are willing to pay different prices for the
same commodity. This discovery is relatively unsurprising when
viewed in light of consumer purchase patterns. Consumer purchase
patterns for conventional goods display a similarly varied willing-
ness. It does not follow that, of the customers who are willing to
pay different prices for the same coffeemaker, the customers paying
56 Id. at 38.
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the most will necessarily derive a greater advantage from possession
of the merchandise.
Furthermore, in analyzing purchasing decisions, should the
perceptions of advantage or the advantage actually obtained be the
primary concern? Are the real outcomes of a purchase decision the
basis for a purchase, or is the basis merely expectation of advan-
tage? The same question applies to the purchase of licenses to com-
mit crimes. An offender might be willing to pay the recidivist
surcharge because of expectations that have little to do with reality,
and, in fact, the offender might well place himself at a disadvantage
in making the purchase. Unless there is a willingness to define a
priori the commission of crime as representing an unfair advantage,
without regard for the consequences of the offense, it is hard to un-
derstand how the "unfair advantage" notion can lead to an accept-
ance of punitive enhancements for recidivists.
A somewhat different conceptualization of the unfair advantage
notion focuses not only upon the willingness of the offender to take
what belongs to others, but also upon the offender's exercise of spe-
cial skills acquired at public expense. This line of argument sug-
gests that recidivists possess special advantages enabling them to be
more effective perpetrators of crime. The experience of apprehen-
sion, prosecution, and conviction provides instruction on how to
avoid most effectively the full impact of the criminal justice system
in future encounters. According to this view, recidivists are more
threatening than non-recidivists because this experience increases
the probability that they will be able to elude detection, capture, and
conviction and thus will be able to continue to victimize society with
relative impunity. To offset this additional capability, the justice sys-
tem must provide an elevated punitive response. Note that this ar-
gument is not the utilitarian argument that crime prevention
demands extended punitive incapacitation. Rather, it is that the
possession of special abilities to do harm puts the individual in a
position of heightened responsibility not to exercise those abilities.
The failure to meet this responsibility justifies additional increments
of punishment.
This notion of heightened responsibility is not uniquely appli-
cable to criminals. For instance, politicians have the power to use
their special position in the community for their personal advantage
and to the detriment of the community. When a politician, accepts a
one hundred dollar bribe, what is shocking is not the magnitude of
the material gain, but rather the abuse of power and position. If
respected citizens are especially blameworthy because they take un-
fair advantage of their special positions, why is it unjust to attribute
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to the experienced, skillful former convict an elevated component of
blameworthiness when he takes advantage of his privileged informa-
tion to commit additional crimes? Society is more vulnerable when
its politicians, role models, and pillars of the community acquire cit-
izen trust. When they violate that trust, they take unfair advantage.
The same can be said of the recidivist. The repeat offender has
learned some of the secrets of the system, and society is therefore
more vulnerable. Yet, there is no punitive or even incapacitative
premium applied to the first offense to offset the acquisition of this
knowledge. The convict is trusted not to make ill-use of the infor-
mation. The behavioral expectations applied to the convict, which
are also applied to persons vested with conventional power and in-
fluence, are not identical to those applied to the average citizen. As
a consequence of rightly expecting more, society is justified in blam-
ing more when its expectations are not met.
This line of reasoning seems to hold the convict responsible for
the potential benefits of an education never sought. The expecta-
tions that society maintains for public officials accompany what are
presumably the benefits of the position. These elevated expecta-
tions can be understood as a tariff that must be paid for success.
Sometimes such expectations are even formally codified, as in the
United States Senate's Code of Ethics. 57 In addition, both the ad-
vantages and the heightened responsibilities comprise a package
that can be declined. After all, despite occasional rhetoric about
drafting candidates, no one is forced to accept public office. Re-
gardless of what one thinks of assigning special responsibilities to
public figures simply because they happen to be in the public eye,
that situation is not comparable to that of the convict who exper-
iences the intrusion of the criminal justice system against his or her
will. The convict experiences the special lessons that exposure to
the system provides not out of willingness to improve upon educa-
tional attainments, but out of the forced subjection represented by
captivity. Acquisition of secrets to "beat the system," and the ele-
vated responsibility entailed by the possession of those secrets, are
not the trade-off for other compensating advantages. Thus, the as-
sertion that criminals bear the extra responsibility that all in posi-
tions of advantage bear, and are therefore culpable in an extra
measure of blameworthiness when they fail to behave responsibly,
appears unpersuasive. Criminals are not sufficiently analogous to
those holding legitimate positions of trust and influence.
Another approach to the contention that recidivists actually
57 See S. Doc. No. 1, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 65-77 (1984).
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perpetrate more harm than their first-time offender counterparts is
the argument that recurrent crime demoralizes society, undermines
confidence in public institutions, and generates a fear that dimin-
ishes the quality of life. 58 Public knowledge of recidivistic criminal
activity reveals the ineffectiveness of efforts to control crime. Of
course, this form of asserted harm is presumably subject to various
attempts at empirical measurement. Citizen attitudes regarding
prospects for the future, fear of visiting the downtown theatre dis-
trict at night, the moral character of young people, the fear of crimi-
nal victimization in one's own neighborhood, confidence in the
capacity of the penal system to effect desired modifications in the
behavior of convicts, and faith in the police as agents of crime pre-
vention, are some of the topics that have already been examined. 59
More direct methods, such as observations of the level of avoidance
behavior of citizens in high risk neighborhoods, could also be uti-
lized. Time series analyses of these kinds of data might help reveal
trends in the impact of recidivism on social life.
The assertion of a heightened level of demoralization, fear, and
degraded life quality resulting from recidivism itself, apart from the
substantive harm caused by the instant act, is therefore a claim re-
quiring empirical substantiation. Recidivism may well result in such
additional harms, yet it would seem that when deprivations of lib-
erty or property are at stake, as they are when punishment is at is-
sue, the burden of proof falls upon those who assert the injury.
Pending demonstration of the existence and magnitude of such
harms, it is difficult to see how punitive enhancements can be im-
posed in a system of desert-based just punishment.
V. ARGUMENTS OF LENIENCY
Punitive traditions have long included provisions for leniency.
In the Gospel according to Matthew, the plight of a debt-ridden
slave is described.60 The slave is condemned to be sold, along with
his family and possessions, in order to satisfy a debt. Upon the en-
treaties of the slave, the master relents. "And the lord of that slave
58 A recent example is the case of the California man convicted of the rape and muti-
lation of a teenage girl. After completion of a prison term, the State attempted to re-
lease him on parole. Both the State of Florida and numerous California municipalities
refused to accept him into their jurisdictions. Public apprehension has run so high that
California has been forced to house him temporarily in a trailer situated on the grounds
of a state correctional facility. See Gainesville Sun, June 17, 1987, at 4A.
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felt compassion and released him and forgave the debt." 61 In eight-
eenth century England, juries displayed leniency in their implemen-
tation of the Bloody Code. 62 The so-called "pious perjury" of
bringing convictions of petit larceny in cases warranting conviction
for grand larceny became a regular strategy for showing leniency
toward thieves at risk of execution. In early nineteenth century New
York, the state issued pardons to approximately one-half of its in-
mates, in part due to the recognition that sentences were often un-
duly severe. 63
Leniency is pertinent to discussion of enhancements of punish-
ment because analysts such as von Hirsch have argued that recidivist
statutes can be viewed as the withholding of the leniency that typi-
cally defaults to non-recidivist offenders.
The role of prior record I am proposing is one that reduces severities
of punishment. The first offender is to get less punishment than he
would were the presence or absence of a criminal record disregarded
in assessing deserts; and the previously-convicted offender is not to
get any more punishment than he would in a hypothetical desert-based
system that ignored prior criminality. 64
Thus, the so-called "enhancements" of punishment directed at re-
cidivists are in actuality little more than a return to the pure use of
offense-based desert as the determinant of sentence. Fletcher's
term "recidivist premium" is really the flip side of "non-recidivist
discount." 65 In this view, the defense of the recidivist premium is
actually the defense of mitigations in sentence for non-recidivists.
Why would the default condition be one of discount? Von
Hirsch offers three arguments in support of this discount. First, it is
reasonable to accord to the non-recidivist offender "some respect
for the fact that his inhibitions against wrongdoing have functioned
on previous occasions, and show some sympathy for the all-too-
human frailty that can lead someone to such a lapse." 66 Second, the
initial offense is
something that fallible humans are capable of doing in an unguarded
moment; that the adverse judgment of others is designed to give the
person the opportunity to reflect and set his priorities straight; and
that he is entitled to have it assumed that he takes such adverse judg-
ment to heart, in the absence of subsequent conduct by him to the
61 Id.
62 M. IGNATIEFF, AJUST MEASURE OF PAIN 19 (1978).
63 B. McKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS: A HISTORY OF GOOD INTENTIONS 27 (1978).
McKelvey also points out that the pursuit of practical goals, such as the reduction of
overcrowding, provided other incentives to issue pardons. Id. at 61.
64 von Hirsch, supra note 19, at 613.
65 See Fletcher, supra note 17.




At the time of sentencing, the manner in which the offender will
respond to the punishment he or she will receive is unknown. As a
moral agent, the offender gets a "second chance" 68 to modify his
behavior and to respond properly to the punishment. Thus, initial
punishment entails "muting our disapproval of the actor
somewhat." 69
Von Hirsch's third point is that the notions of "human frailty"
and "second chance" are important because they reflect the opera-
tion of tolerance. Von Hirsch states that "[t]olerance refers to the
willingness to overlook wrongdoing to some extent in deciding how
much disapproval a person deserves for his acts. Tolerance, in
other words, is something that is exercised in determining the level
of response that is deemed deserved."' 70 Furthermore, von Hirsch
argues, "tolerance is granted on the grounds that some sympathy is
due human beings for their fallibility and their exposure to pres-
sures and temptations; and some respect is owed for their capacity,
as moral agents, to respond to others' censure and to reconsider
their future course." 71
Thus, human frailty, moral agency, and tolerance form a triadic
justification for punitive leniency. It is important to note that, for
von Hirsch, tolerance is not simply an exercise in mercy. As he
notes above, deference is owed out of respect for human frailty and
moral agency. Von Hirsch points out that tolerance, properly un-
derstood, is tolerance considered as a factor determining the de-
served response. Tolerance is not applied apart from
determinations of desert, as in the application of mercy, but rather
is an integral part of the desert-determination process.
Von Hirsch's arguments are both appealing and puzzling. It is
easy to feel comfortable with the notions of "human frailty," "sec-
ond chance," and "tolerance." It is easy to recall circumstances in
which personal experience seems well-captured by these ideas.
Who has not fallen prey to what can be perceived as personal
human frailty? Who has not made erroneous decisions that seemed
"out of character?" Who has not benefited from the tolerance of
others and from being given a second chance? Yet, the fact that
people are able to apply their experience to these concepts means
neither that this application is accurate nor that it has any applica-
67 Id. at 602.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 603.
70 Id. at 603 n.25.
71 Id. at 603.
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tion to the sentencing problem at issue. Society may want to believe
in human frailty as an explanation for "errors," but such a belief
may be little more than a rationalization for conduct.
What is it that society wants to assume about human conduct?
Do actors freely make decisions for which they properly can be
lauded or censured? It is important to understand precisely what
the notion of "human frailty" means. To von Hirsch, this concept
apparently means that actors are not as culpable when they commit
acts that are first-occurrence acts, that are acts out of character with
their typical behavior. This interpretation seems to harken back to
the primary deviants of Lemert, whose early acts of deviance were
out of keeping with their normal behavior. 72 In rejecting the thesis
that first-timer offenders must be shown leniency as part of a strat-
egy to give the offender proper notice that what was done was
wrong, von Hirsch writes that these initial acts may result from the
offender "for the moment [placing] his own needs or inclinations
above the requirements of doing right."73
It is difficult, however, to see how this process of placing per-
sonal needs above doing right distinguishes first offense motives
from those associated with recidivism. Fallible humans may submit
to their "own needs" once as a result of fallibility, or they may sub-
mit multiple times, again because of fallibility. How can it be deter-
mined that human fallibility appears as a blame-reducing factor and,
by implication, as an explanation for the offense, only on initial
forays into crime? Furthermore, is fallibility, the tendency to err,
beyond the actor's power to control? If it is, how can any blame be
assigned to the offender? If it is not, how can the diminution of
responsibility be justified? Given the general willingness of retribu-
tive theory to assume personal responsibility, if the actor is truly
responsible and knew in advance that what was done was wrong,
why does the actor deserve "the opportunity to reflect and set his
priorities straight?" 74
The assertion that human acts are sometimes the consequence
of frailty, and merit tolerance that expresses itself in the issuance of
second chances, raises questions about the underlying causes of
human behavior. In addition, this assertion poses questions about
the existence of frailty in particular cases. Are we to assume that
frailty works its will only on a teenager's initial illegal drink, the
speeder's first driving ticket, or the student's first excursion into
72 E. LEMERT, SOCIAL PATHOLOGY (1951).




cheating? Von Hirsch regards the continued participation in unde-
sired acts as evidence of fully responsible and thus, fully blamewor-
thy, behavior. It seems equally reasonable, however, to view the
failure to properly "reflect and set his priorities straight" 75 as evi-
dence of an even more profound than expected measure of human
frailty. Furthermore, if it is reasonable to assume that the influence
of frailty will not necessarily be limited to motivating first offenses,
then how can it be determined when a repeat offender has fallen
from grace again simply as a result of frailty? In addition, how can
those cases in which frailty played no part in even the first offense be
identified? Before frailty can be operationalized as a defense for
sentence mitigation, far more detailed specification than has cur-
rently been achieved will be required. If what an individual deserves
is to depend, in part, upon how much the offense can be attributed
to human frailty, it is imperative that frailty be something that can
both be demonstrated in the general case and recognized in the par-
ticular case. Of course, from the retributivist point of view, this
would seem to require a relatively uncomfortable shift toward addi-
tional consideration of individualistic variables.
Mercy operates somewhat differently than tolerance as a mitiga-
tor of punitive severity. Generally, mercy is applied to reduce pun-
ishment even when desert dictates otherwise. It is possible tojustify
mercy on a number of grounds. Beccaria argued that mercy had
long been justified as a remedy for punishments that were exces-
sively severe.76 A papal encyclical issued in 1980 asserted that
mercy, though not identical to justice, was quite compatible with
justice. 77 Modern advocates of desert-based justice have proposed
their own operationalizations of mercy. For instance, Gross's prin-
ciple of sentence mitigation permits administration of sentences less
severe than deserved out of deference to concerns apart from de-
sert.78 In referring to factors such as the unusual hardships on a
convict's family, convict cooperation with the state in securing the
convictions of others, and the amends already made for harm com-
mitted, Gross notes that "[t]he punishment deserved is no less when
these things are taken into consideration, but since what is deserved
is not all that matters in deciding what sentence is right, there is
75 von Hirsch, supra note 19, at 602.
76 C. BECCARIA-BONESANA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (rev. ed. 1963).
Contrarily, he held that if the laws were properly crafted, there would be no need for
mercy because the law would already contain the proper remedy for the offending act.
(Chapter 20).
77 N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 156 (1982).
78 H. GROSS, supra note 40, at 449.
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good reason for a lighter sentence in spite of'that."79 Gross thus
diverges from von Hirsch's application of tolerance in arguing that
mercy is to be applied apart from considerations of desert and does
not affect the determinations of desert. More particularly, Gross
writes:
Apart from justice, there is mercy. If justice is without rigor, justice is
undone; and yet the harshness often accompanying rigorous justice
may be tempered without causing justice to be undone. But merciful
dispensation is not available on the easiest terms. Mercy is always
given without there being a claim of right to it, and so it is exceedingly
difficult to distinguish the compassion of common decency that ought
to influence a sentence from the tender regard that is a precious
human sentiment but has no place in the deliberations of a sentencing
judge.80
Gross does not develop an argument in favor of these propositions.
Rather, he points out that certain factors have been used as mitiga-
tors, that it seems right to use them as such, and that mercy itself
may rightfully be included in the sentence-determination process.
As he notes above, mercy is an important factor apart from justice
and can be invoked without jeopardizing the justice of a sentence.
Receiving a punishment of less than is deserved as a result of the
application of mercy is perfectly consistent with justice.
Gross expresses concern about the practical problem of being
able to specify when mitigating factors such as mercy can be used
safely and when their use places the justice of a sentence at risk.8s
The problem of where to draw the line, however, is not the only
difficulty associated with this view. It is unclear why mercy, which is
an act of favor offered from unobligated compassion and not out of
respect for what is due, has any place in the sentencing of criminals.
Proponents of the justice model typically insist that punishment be
strictly determined by what is deserved. Though arguing for mitiga-
tion of sentence for non-recidivists, von Hirsch maintains that
human frailty should be included as a factor in the computation of
desert, thereby sidestepping the difficulty that is inherent in Gross's
view of the role of mercy. That a sentence of less than what one
deserves is nonetheless just suggests either that the notion ofjustice
has unexplored conceptual creases or crevasses or that punishment
is somewhat less strictly tied only to desert than is generally argued.
A common answer to these questions is that desert is a limiting,
not a defining, principle.8 2 Desert sets the boundaries within which
79 Id.
80 Id. at 451.
81 Id.
82 A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 31, at 38-46.
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sentences may be modified without violating the integrity or the jus-
tice of the sentence. Within these boundaries, it is possible for any
number of factors to be applied to accomplish various goals. Even
utilitarian goals may be pursued so long as justice is not jeopardized
by their pursuit. This formulation, however, still holds desert as the
determining factor in sentencing. Mercy cannot be applied so as to
produce sentences beyond what is stipulated by desert. Gross ar-
gues that a sentence of less than what is deserved might, nonethe-
less, be just.83
Finally, it is possible to conceive of leniency as a device to ac-
comodate for the possibility that actors conduct themselves on the
basis of partially formed judgmental processes. For example,
juveniles arguably are only partially mature agents of their own be-
havior. Their lack of experience and understanding limits the ex-
tent to which they can be held fully responsible. Thus, lenient
sentences are distributed to juveniles out of deference to their par-
tially formed character. Such leniency also provides the "second
chance" discussed above, not because of a general desire to allow
for self-scrutiny, but, rather, because of the expectation that young
people are not fully prepared to exercise responsible citizenship.
This view of the role of leniency focuses on the extent to which
juveniles are only partially formed agents of responsible behavior.
The notion of "partial responsibility," discussed long ago by Aris-
totle,8 4 is still troublesome today. The merits of hard or soft deter-
minism versus free will are beyond the scope of this discussion.
However, even if partial responsibility is possible, the ways in which
particular degrees of responsibility are to be associated with particu-
lar amounts of culpability must be specified. The decision to com-
mit a delinquent act may be the result of a 99% formed character or
the result of a 25% formed character. How is the magnitude of re-
sponsibility associated with any particular juvenile actor to be deter-
mined? Without a validated method of determination, specification
of the amount of leniency warranted in the distribution of punish-
ment is problematic. Beyond the particular case of juveniles, the
determination of desert would seem to require a level of discrimina-
tory precision that exceeds current capabilities.
VI. ARGUMENTS OF EMOTIONAL RECOMPENSE
Retributivism can be defended, at least in part, by appealing to
the right of victims to experience pleasure at the offender's suffer-
83 H. GROSS, supra note 40, at 449.
84 ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHics, Book 3.
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ing. According to this view, sometimes described as "satisfaction
theory," victimization establishes a right to such recompense. It is
part of the "payment of the debt" owed by the offender.8 5 The
pleasure felt at the suffering of another is not barbaric. Indeed, the
desire for such gratification resides deep within the constitution of
man and is as much a part of humanity as the inclination to mercy.
It is, therefore, both reasonable to desire such repayment for victim-
ization and proper that the payment b'e accepted.
J.L. Mackie, in his discussion of retributive emotion, finds a par-
adox in the coexistence of the impossibility of a reasonable defense
of retributivism and the indisputable omnipresence of retributivism
in moral thought.8 6 Whether one agrees with his analysis of the
possibility of a reasonable justification of the retributive principle, it
is difficult not to be receptive to his point about retributive emotion;
there does seem to be a widespread and longstanding affinity for
retributivism.
Furthermore, it is possible to apply Mackie's observation to the
matter of recidivism. As Fletcher has suggested, individuals seem to
possess a powerful intuition that recidivistic involvement in crime
merits an extra measure of punitive sanction.8 7 There is something
special about repeat acts of unacceptable behavior. Just as a child is
perceived to be ever more incorrigible if he or she continues to ne-
glect instructions, a special evil is associated with the criminal recidi-
vist. The child becomes not merely one who commits unacceptable
act after unacceptable act, but rather one who acquires a new fea-
ture altogether, namely, incorrigibility. The child now has a charac-
teristic that is undesirable and worthy of attention apart from the
particular attitudes that provided the motivation for the individual
unacceptable acts. To know that the child is incorrigible, even if
nothing else of the child is known, is to know that he or she requires
attention.
A similar result occurs with the recidivist. Recidivism itself,
stripped naked of its particular content, becomes the object of con-
cern. Society perceives a need to respond not only to the evil acts
perpetrated, but also to the recidivistic condition itself. The emo-
tional desire to experience an increased measure of satisfaction at
the suffering of the recidivist seems to accord with conventional
retributivism.
It is possible, however, to acknowledge the existence of a
85 Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q 238, 241-42 (1979).
86 Mackie, Morality and the Retributive Emotions 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3 (1982).
87 Fletcher, supra note 17, at 57.
638 [Vol. 78
JUSTICE IN SENTENCING
human characteristic without insisting that the feature be preserved
through our social institutions. That humans seem to have a rela-
tively enduring capacity for various forms of evil has not motivated
society to incorporate such evil into the normative system. Simply
because men have murdered each other from time immemorial,
there is no apparent inclination to embrace homicide as acceptable
behavior. Feelings of racial hatred become no less evil merely be-
cause history reveals that such feelings have been remarkably persis-
tent. Rather, society recognizes the need to do battle with
humanity's darkest inclinations. Religious institutions, for example,
commit a fair amount of their resources to combatting and attempt-
ing to eliminate practices that violate the will of God. As Cotting-
ham notes, that a particular social response is desired by various
parties, such as punishment inflicted to provide satisfaction to a vic-
tim, is no evidence that the course is desirable from either a social
policy or an ethical perspective.8 8
Should society be content to accept retributivist emotions as
worthy of normative preservation and codification in law simply be-
cause such feelings have been a regular part of human reactions?
Would it not be reasonable to insist on a demonstration of the mer-
its of the retributitive emotion itself, apart from the fact that citizens
often possess such emotions? In the absence of such a demonstra-
tion, it is difficult to be receptive to the "retribution-as-emotional
satisfaction" thesis for either retributivism in general or for its par-
ticular application to recidivism.
VII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This Article has examined four general kinds of justifications
for the use of prior record as a variable in the sentencing of
criminals within the confines of the justice model of punishment.
These arguments make various and, at times, conflicting claims
about justice, desert, human nature, personal responsibility, and the
harmfulness of criminal acts. Some of the arguments appeal to
emotional experience, some to sentencing traditions, others to an
understanding of what it means to be a free agent, and yet others to
society's conception of the damage wrought by repetitive criminal
activity. There have been many defenses of the use of prior record,
and they have been articulated by a large, diverse, and competent
body of analysts. This diverse advocacy suggests either the exist-
ence of either a heartfelt, but mistaken, appreciation of prior behav-
88 Cottingham, supra note 85, at 242.
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ior as a determinant of how individuals are evaluated, or the real
merits of prior record as a justly utilized variable in sentencing.
It is worth noting that some of the arguments appear to follow
the conventional lines of the justice model view of punishment more
closely than others. The model's important focus upon the crime,
rather than upon variables long associated with the individual,
seems better retained by arguments of elevated harm than by those
of implicit attribute. Proponents of the implicit attribute argument
insist on the validity of assertions about the character of the individ-
ual, such as the possession of defiant attitudes, and argue that these
attributes compound the blameworthiness of the offender. Propo-
nents of elevated harm arguments assert that deserved punishment
is bound by the harmful consequences of the offending behavior
and that recidivistic behavior creates harms that exceed the simple
sum of the individual damages associated with each component
crime. Leniency-based arguments vary in their conformity to desert
as a determinative principle. Gross suggests that desert is not the
only factor to consider in handing down a just sentence, while von
Hirsch argues that tolerance is due to non-recidivists and should be
factored into the computation of desert. Finally, proponents of ar-
guments of emotional recompense take the discussion to the heart
of retributivism. The persistent, enduring existence of an emotional
need to inflict pain upon those who violate the criminal law may
provide a basis for both retributively-based punishment in general
and, by extension, its application to those who insist on recidivistic
activity.
A number of concerns about these various arguments have
been discussed in this Article. Such concerns include questions
about the empirical status of important assertions, such as the exist-
ence of defiance in repeat offenders and the increases in real harm
produced by recidivist enterprises. They also include questions
about the nature of justice and its tolerance for factors other than
desert, such as mercy, as sentence determinants. It has been sug-
gested that the apparent historical endurance of retributive emo-
tions may offer little justification for either retributivism as a general
predicate of punishment or as a rationale for the use of prior record
in sentencing. In sum, this Article has attempted to show that a sig-
nificant number of questions crucial to the justification of the use of
prior record in sentencing remain unanswered. The unanswered
status of these questions suggests caution in embracing the use of
prior record as an important sentence determinant in justice model
sentencing systems.
This caution seems especially appropriate given the reform in-
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clinations of various states. It has become conventional for new de-
terminate sentencing systems to include prior record as a factor
affecting sentence severity. For instance, Florida's rules of criminal
procedure include the following provisions:
The primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender. Re-
habilitation and other traditional considerations continue to be de-
sired goals of the criminal justice system but must assume a
subordinate role. The penalty imposed should be commensurate with
the severity of the convicted offense and the circumstances surround-
ing the offense. The severity of the sanction-should increase with the
length and nature of the offender's criminal history.89
It is apparent from these provisions, and from the factors included
in the sentence score sheets used to compute sentences for felony
offenders, 90 that Florida's criminal justice system has moved away
from utilitarian goals toward retributive aims, has identified crime
seriousness as the key variable in sentence determination, and has
included prior record as an important factor in the sentence deter-
mination process. For example, the sentence guideline score sheets
for robbery include weights for the current offense, probation or
parole status at the time of the offense, and level of injury to the
victim.91 Prior record for robbery is composed of two sub-scores,
the first for prior convictions of any offense and the second for prior
convictions in the current crime's offense category. An individual
convicted in Florida of first-degree robbery without any additional
instant offenses, who had a prior record consisting of one first-de-
gree robbery and one first-degree non-robbery felony, who perpe-
trated no physical harm and was under no parole or probation
restrictions would receive a sum score of 221: 70 (instant offense)
+ 126 (prior record) + 25 (in-category prior record).92 Almost
70% (126 + 25 = 151; 151/221=69%) of the guidelines score is
the result of the contribution of prior record. Were prior record not
a factor in this case, the offender would receive a sentence of three
years incarceration instead of the ten-year sentence provided by the
guidelines. In Florida, at least for some offenses, prior record is not
only an important factor, it is the most important factor in determin-
ing the appropriate sentence.
Florida is not alone in its adoption of determinate sentencing
systems which use prior record.93 Unfortunately, penal reforms
have moved ahead without adequate concern for many of the issues
89 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 648 (West 1986).
90 FLA. STAT. ANN. Rule 3.988 (West 1986).
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 For example, California's Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act took effect in July,
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raised in this Article. Of course, much of this enthusiasm and re-
form activity can be attributed to the crime control goals of reform-
ers and legislators, rather than solely to a stubborn, hard-nosed
retributivism that pushes ahead without concern for important ques-
tions that remain unanswered. Yet, there is reason to be concerned
about the future. If prior record can occupy such an important role
in our new sentencing systems, despite some of the potential weak-
nesses of the rationales justifying its use, what is to prevent other
equally controversial personal factors from finding a home in public
policy? Von Hirsch seems relatively unconcerned about this issue.
He points to the experience of states such as Minnesota and notes
that their experience has failed to affirm concerns with abuses such
as escalating sentence severity or inclusion of offender personal at-
tributes as factors in determining sentences. 94 However, it is diffi-
cult to share von Hirsch's optimism. After all, systems such as that
used in Minnesota have been in place for a relatively short period of
time, historically speaking. It would be lacking in proper method-
ological caution to track a felon for one week after he has served his
prison sentence in the hope of learning whether he has gone
straight. A week is simply not long enough. Similarly, too few years
have passed since the development of the new sentencing systems to
justify high levels of optimism.
Of course, one can wait forever. Advocates of the rehabilitative
model have been accused of endlessly arguing that the model has
not been given enough time for a proper assessment.95 But, even
apart from the problem of determining an adequate test period,
there is reason for concern simply because responsible voices injus-
tice-oriented penal theory argue that personal factors ought to have
a role in determining proper punishment. In discussing personal
history, Gross writes:
Such a record may include not only past crime but active criminal asso-
ciation that marks a man's life as a life of crime. Reference to a record
of crime or active criminal association might be for the proper purpose
of preventing a mitigation of sentence that might otherwise be right;
1977. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170, 3040 (West 1984). Minnesota's determinate guide-
lines became operative in August, 1979.
94 von Hirsch, supra note 19, at 632.
95 See Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison Reform 35 PUB. INT. 22
(1974). In a neglected passage in his storm-provoking article, Martinson asserts:
From this probability, one may draw any of several conclusions. It may be simply
that our programs aren't yet good enough-that the education we provide inmates
is still poor education, that the therapy we administer is not administered skillfully
enough, that our intensive supervision and counseling do not yet provide enough




or it might be for the improper purpose of imposing a heavier sen-
tence than the crime deserves.9 6
Gross indicates that factors beyond conviction, such as an offender's
personal lifestyle, may be justly utilized to determine desert.
American correctional history, however, is littered with exam-
ples of the abuse of such criteria. The record of abuses perpetrated
on those living "disfavored" lifestyles, such as immigrants, blacks,
the poor, and other minorities suggests skepticism regarding the
potential for the just use of the lifestyle variable, irrespective of how
it might be formally operationalized. Nonetheless, the existence of
credible voices arguing for the justice of using such factors and the
aggressive public clamor for tougher sentencing represent powerful
influences potentially capable of bringing such variables into roles
of prominence. The point here is political, and has less to do with
the ultimate integrity of the justice model than with the uses to
which penal ideas are put by those capable of exercising power.
One of the tools available to stave off abuses of the original intent of
penal reform is a well-conceived punitive rationale that presents a
solid and coherent front to the possessors of power who would se-
lectively adopt bits and pieces of reform strategies to suit their own
political agenda. A punitive rationale that cannot solve problems
found at its own doorstep is unlikely to provide such a front. How
will the rationale explain that certain kinds of offender variables,
such as attitudes of defiance, are acceptable for use in sentencing,
while other similar variables, such as attitudes toward giving to char-
itable organizations, are irrelevant?9 7 If the rationale cannot make
these kinds of distinctions clearly, it may confront severe difficulties
when faced with proposals to include heretofore unacceptable vari-
ables that it is unable to exclude on analytic grounds.
96 H. GROSS, supra note 38, at 456.
97 A. VON HipscH, supra note 29, at 172. Von Hirsch argues that policies which in-
volve "drastic sacrifices of equity" are to be rejected. But, what principles can be used
to determine when such sacrifices are drastic? Von Hirsch recognizes the legitimacy of
some sacrifices of equity, such as those associated with quarantine, but it remains un-
clear how principled judgments might be made which result in justified deprivations of
liberty.
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